The Macro-Economic Implications of COVID-19 in developing countries

Ricardo Hausmann

Harvard Kennedy School


Caveats

- First time I give this talk
 - Hoping to learn from your comments
- It covers topics I know little about
 - Ignorance is daring
- It deals with horrible moral trade-offs
 - Do no shoot the messenger
- It focuses on developing countries
 - Too much of the discussion in the US has been inward looking
 - Growth Lab projects in Ethiopia, Albania, El Salvador, Venezuela

What is happening?

- When it rain, it pours
- Coronavirus COVID-19
 - How to think about it from an economics perspective?
- Collapse in access to foreign income
 - Collapse in commodity prices
 - Collapse in tourism
 - Expected collapse in remittances
- Collapse in access to capital markets

Some countries rely on very few commodities








Different countries, different combinations

- Commodity exporters vs. commodity importers
- Oil prices declined to the lowest levels since 2003!!!
- Bad news for Nigeria, Colombia, Venezuela
- Good news for Ethiopia, Albania and El Salvador

CL1:COM Generic 1st 'CL' Future	WTI Oil Prices	AS OF 09:58 AM EDT 03/19/2020 ED
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BloombergMarkets		,

Some countries are highly dependent on remittances



Some countries are highly reliant on tourism

COVID-19 may represent a huge shock to tourism

		2018	4
1	Macau	72.2	
2	Seychelles	67.1	
3	Maldives	66.4	
4	St Kitts and Nevis	62.4	
5	Grenada	56.6	
6	Vanuatu	48.0	
7	Cape Verde	46.2	
8	St Vincent and the Gre	45.5	
9	Belize	44.9	
10	Antigua and Barbuda	44.1	
11	St Lucia	41.8	
12	Bahamas	40.4	
13	Fiji	38.9	
14	Barbados	34.9	
15	Jamaica	34.0	
16	Georgia	33.7	
17	Dominica	33.4	
18	Cambodia	32.8	
19	Iceland	32.6	
20	Sao Tome and Principe	27.8	
21	Albania	27.3	
		Sign up	f

Bond prices have collapsed





Colombia




El Salvador

All of these are shocks we have seen before

- We know, in principle, how to handle them
- Three ingredients
- Increased external (official) finance
 - To make adjustments more gradual
- Adopt expenditure reducing policies
 - Cuts to public and private deficits through fiscal and monetary contraction to bring spending in line with lower long-term income
- Expenditure switching policies
 - To make more of the spending go to local output through e.g. real exchange rate depreciation
- This approach works less well when many countries are in the same boat
 - Like now

But what about Coronavirus COVID-19?

What kind of a shock is this?



The logic of flattening the curve




Figure 1: Flattening the Pandemic Curve

Source: Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas

Things to notice

- Flattening the curve means that there will be fewer cases at any point in time
- ...but it does not directly affect the total number of people who eventually get the disease
 - Unless it gives time to develop a vaccine
- Prevents the health care system from being overwhelmed
 - This should lower the death rate, as patients would have ventilators and ICUs
- It delays the peak of the crisis
 - Makes the process longer
- Increases the chances that by then we would have better treatment and/or a vaccine

But how do you flatten the curve?

- By restricting human activity
- But this restricts GDP
 - Harvard (especially Exec Ed)
 - Broadway
 - Airlines
 - Bars, restaurants, gyms
- Lockdown impacts all activities
- But these decisions percolate through the economy amplifying the initial effect
 - Lay-offs
 - Bankruptcies
 - Non-performing loans in the banking system


What does this mean?

- The fight against COVID-19 starts as a supply shock
 - You cannot produce
- But as it percolates through the economy, some are hit by supply shocks
 - You cannot make X because somebody did not make input Y
- Others are hit by negative demand shocks
 - Laid-off workers spend less
 - Bankrupt firms will not invest and will not be there when the crisis is over
- This amplifies the initial contraction
- While the initial shock may be hard to avoid, this amplification could be addressed
 - Protect workers, firms, banks
- ...using fiscal (i.e. public resources, capacity to borrow)


This is different from a garden-variety recession

- It is a supply shock, not a demand shock
- It percolates through both supply and demand channels
- Traditional Keynesian policies have limited effectiveness
 - More demand for Broadway plays does not cause more plays in a lockdown
- Lay-offs and bankruptcies make the recovery much slower
 - Hard to hire, hard to form new ventures
- So fiscal policy can help but not through the standard channels
 - By helping people and firms withstand the shock

The difference between the shock with and without fiscal protection



Flattening the epidemic curve worsens GDP



Source: Author's elaboration, inspired by illustrations in the chapter by Gourinchas.

Source: Richard Baldwin

So the solution seems to be clear

- Social distancing and lockdown to prevent infections
 - Bad for GDP
- Fiscal action (with monetary accommodation) to prevent the amplification and long term damage of the lockdown
 - Good for people short term
 - Good for the eventual recovery of the economy
- Typical instruments
 - Maintain payment of payroll or provide unemployment insurance
 - Provide special loans to business
 - Provide regulatory forbearance to banks so that they can reschedule loans

But what if countries have no fiscal space?

- Many countries are fiscally weak in good times
- With the COVID-19 shock, their fiscal space may disappear
 - tax revenues decline
 - Especially if they get a terms of trade, tourism or remittance shock
 - The crisis requires more health expenditures and ideally spending to cushion the blow
- None of this is good for the country's creditworthiness
- But if, in addition, financial markets shut down, the government may not be even forced to cut back!
- So fiscal policy cannot play the same role as in the standard recommendation, say for the US

In other words

- Without fiscal space, flattening the epidemic curve is costlier
- So countries may be forced to / "choose" not to fight the virus by as much
- ...leading to faster spread,
- more deaths because of lower capacity to treat
- ... and a faster end to the epidemic, assuming no re-infection
- In other words, lack of fiscal space costs lives

But many countries are trying to avoid this

- Some countries without much fiscal space have nevertheless opted for lockdowns
 - Albania and El Salvador, in our network
- How should they manage it?
- How should they prioritize the use of their fiscal space?
 - Health system
 - Livelihoods
 - Firm survival

What to use the lockdown for?

- A lockdown promises to bring the trajectory of cases / deaths down, <u>relative to a counter-factual</u>
- But a lockdown is not sustainable
 - Eventually, people will have to decide between dying of the virus and starving to death
- Unsustainable situations cannot last
- So you will eventually need to resume production, but how?
- How can the cost of the lockdown be lowered?
- ... and how should it be shared?

How do you get out of a lockdown?

- Wait for a treatment or vaccine?
 - May be too long
- Wait for cases to go down and your testing and ICU capacity to go up
 - But then, use the lockdown time efficiently
 - Markets for medical inputs may become congested
- Re-open activities gradually
 - Starting with the most critical and least "networky" activities
 - Test frequently and quarantine only the affected as opposed to everybody
- Adjust speed of the re-start as more information is revealed
 - On cases, treatments, capabilities

What should the international financial community do?

Increase fiscal space by expanding the availability of official finance

- Recirculate the flight-to-safety money that is flowing to the US
 - And causing undesired US\$ appreciation
- Quantitative Easing
 - Should Central Banks buy IFI bonds? Emerging Market bonds?
- Increase the number of countries with access to FED swap lines
 - The FED announced this policy this morning but it included only Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Korea, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore and Sweden.
- Why only those?
 - If the concern is credit risk, maybe have those swap lines intermediated by the IMF
- Expand the use of existing credit facilities
 - IMF's Rapid Finance Instrument, Stand-by arrangements, other IFIs
- Support for dollarized economies
 - They do not have a lender of last resort
 - El Salvador, Panamá, Ecuador in my part of the world

Thank you!